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A.

Introduction
The asymmetry in the level of environmental protection between developed and
developing countries and its implications for international trade regulation, is an issue
that has risen to the limelight of the public debate over the last decade. This in turn
has caused an outburst in academic writing around this topic.1 On the one hand, there
are calls – originating mostly from environmental groups located in the developed
world - to use international trade measures in order to enforce higher standards on the
developing countries.2 In response, developing countries are invoking the asymmetry
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See for instance, Patrick Low, “Trade and the Environment: What Worries the Developing
Countries”,23 Environmental Law 705 (1993); Daniel Esty, Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment
and the Future (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 1994); Scott Vaughan, “Trade
and Environment: Some North-South Considerations” 27 Cornell Int’l L. J. 591 (1994); Vinod Rege,
“GATT Law and Environment-Related Issues Affecting the Trade of Developing Countries”, 28 J.
World Trade L. (No. 3) 95 (1994); Jagdish Bhagwati & T.N. Srinivasan, “Trade and the Environment:
Does Environmental Diversity Detract from the Case for Free Trade”, in Fair Trade and
Harmonization: Prerequisites for Fair Trade? (Bhagwati & Hudec, eds) (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1996) Vol. 1, Chap. 4.
2
Some examples of the use of such measure are discussed later in this article, and they include the US
embargos on tuna imports and shrimp imports from countries allowing their fleets to employ fishing
methods that cause the death of dolphins and turtles, respectively. For an analysis of these measures,
see Steve Charnowitz, “A Taxonomy of Environmental Trade Measures”, 6 Georgetown Int’l Env. L.
Rev. 1 (1993). This approach was justified by the claim that if higher standards aren’t imposed on the
developing countries, competitive pressure will force the developed countries to lower theirs. As
Walter Russel Mead wrote in a much cited article in Harper’s Magazine: “Either the progressive
systems of the advanced industrial countries will spread into the developing world or the Third World
will move north. Either Mexican wages will move up or American Wages will move down”. “Bushism,
Found: A Second-Term Agenda Hidden in Trade Agreements”, Harper’s Magazine, September 1992,
p. 44.
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in economic development in order to reject these calls and to justify the differences in
environmental protection.3 “When you went through your industrial revolution”, so
goes their argument, “there was a complete disregard of the damage caused to the
environment. Now, when you have reached a high level of development, with much
of your economy relying on the environment-friendly hi-tech and service sectors, and
we are going through our industrial revolution, you want to impose on us standards
that you yourselves never kept?” Thus, most of the opposition against incorporating
environmental norms into the WTO comes from the developing countries, which fear
that it will be used in order to bar their exports to developed countries.4 Indeed,
environmental concerns are quite seldom invoked as a reason to bar exports going the
other way – from the rich to the poorer countries.5
The issue discussed in this article involves exports going that other way. It
relates to products manufactured not only under the perhaps highest possible
environmental standards, but also as part of programs created and designed in order to
save the environment and promote sustainable development. Nevertheless, these very
programs, and these very products, may in certain circumstances actually harm the
environment of developing countries, as a result of the asymmetry in economic
development and environmental protection between them and the developed countries
where the products originate. This may happen, for instance, when such products are
exported to developing countries and have a negative impact on the economic
viability of collection and recycling of their own waste. Newly established and still
struggling recycling plants, unsupported by private or governmental subsidies or other
protective measures prevailing in the rich and more environmentally conscious
3

See Low, supra note 1, at 706-707; and Bhagwati & Srinivasan, ibid., at 168. The need for special
consideration of the asymmetry in economic development of WTO Members is a permanent
component of all official resolutions and instruments of the WTO in the field of trade and environment.
See for instance, “Decision on Trade and Environment”, adopted by ministers at the meeting of the
Uruguay Round Trade Negotiations Committee in Marrakesh on 14 April 1994, Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts (Geneva, 1995) 469, 2nd preamble
(“seeking both to protect and preserve the environment…in a manner consistent with their respective
needs and concerns at different levels of development”). See also the Doha Ministerial Declaration, of
14 November 2001, para. 32, available at:
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm#tradeenvironment . In the Rio
Declaration of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED),
(reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874) it was also recognized that trade-environment issues cannot move forward
in isolation of wider development commitments, such as technology transfer and financing from the
developed to the developing countries.
4
This is evident from the positions of the developing countries in GATT/WTO negotiations. For
example, at the GATT Marrakech Ministerial Meeting in April 1994, the Minister of the Environment
of Malaysia, Rafidah Aziz, stated that environmental issues “are now clearly being used to promote
protectionist motives, particularly to keep out imports from countries which have a better competitive
edge and comparative advantage” (quoted in Vaughan, supra note 1, at 593).
5
One significant exception is the issue of trade in waste or hazardous substances, where various
international treaties seek to restrict the possibility of exporting such substances from developed
countries, with high standards of environmental protection, to developing countries, with low
standards, in order to prevent the latter from becoming the garbage heap of their richer neighbors. For
instance, the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and
their Disposal (1992). That, however, is a much less controversial issue, and the restrictions are not
likely to create any significant job-losses in the developed countries. In this article we will be
discussing mainly export of real products, manufactured by workers in the developed countries under
the highest possible environmental standards, and nevertheless causing harm to the environment of
developing countries.
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countries, may be forced to close down. Alternatively, they may decide to abandon
expensive collection of local waste, in favor of free or subsidized waste imported
from developed countries. In both cases, collection and recycling activities in the
importing countries are reduced, and sometimes eliminated. As a result, developing
countries get stuck with their own waste, which at best piles up in their landfills and at
worst is dumped in nature.
The objective of this article is to document and draw attention to this problem
and to examine the question of what remedies, if any, may be offered under
international trade law (in particular GATT/WTO rules) to affected countries. Would
countries in situations as those described above be permitted to take measures against
imports harming their recycling activities? Of particular interest in this regard, is how
to relate to privately paid, but governmentally induced, subsidies under the WTO
Subsidies Agreement? Such subsidies, while fulfilling most economic definitions of
subsidies, appear to have escaped the attention of the Agreement’s drafters and may
therefore be outside its scope. Importing member countries would therefore be
precluded from taking countervailing measures against products enjoying such
subsidies. These and other potential protective measures will be discussed below, in
light of recent case law of the WTO, in particular in the matter of United States –
Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies.6 This discussion will demonstrate
the formalistic nature of the existing WTO jurisprudence and show how a more
purposive, teleological approach to interpretation of international trade rules could
lead to a better solution to the problem at hand.

B.

Background: Germany’s Recycling Regime
Germany is a pioneer in the field of state recycling laws. In 1991, it passed the
Verpackungsverordnung (Packaging Ordinance), a secondary legislation made under
the authority of the 1986 Abfallgesetz (Waste Act).7 The Ordinance addresses all
types of packaging8 and places the basic responsibility for the recycling or reuse of
packaging material on the manufacturers. By January 1993, industry had a choice:
either a take-back of all primary packaging by the retailers and high mandatory
deposits on all non-refillable containers (for beverages, cleaning materials and
emulsion paints), or exemption from these requirements provided industry set up a
system to recover certain percentages of primary packaging by certain dates. Under
pressure of the retailers, who would not agree to the first option, the manufacturers
agreed to voluntarily set up a company called Duales System Deutschland AG (DSD)
to handle collection and recycling of sales packaging on behalf of the industry. Under
the system, manufacturers selling or importing packaged products must pay a fee to
DSD to pay for the collection, sorting and recycling of the packaging they are using.
This entitles them to put the “Green Dot” symbol on their package. The DSD neither
6

Infra, note 26.
M. Raymond & D. Perchard, Getting Green Dotted: The German Recycling Law Explained in Plain
English (Raymond Communications, 1994).
8
The Ordinance addresses three types of packaging: 1. Transport packaging; 2. Secondary packaging
(boxes used for marketing, some blisters, anti-theft, etc.); 3. Primary packaging. By December 1991,
distributors or manufacturers had to take back all transport packaging or arrange for its recycling or
reuse. As of April1992, retailers had to install containers so consumers cold leave behind secondary
packaging. On primary packaging, see in text.
7
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owns nor runs any sorting and recycling plants itself. These functions are contracted
out to hundreds of plants, both within Germany and outside. In many sectors, the
DSD was forced not only to finance the collection, transportation and sorting of the
waste, but also to subsidize the recycling plants. While the plants often receive the
lion’s share of their income from selling the recycled material in the market, in some
instances they demanded and received subsidies from the DSD in order to make it
worth their while.9
The German consumers responded with an unexpected zeal to participate in
the recycling project, and in practice the amounts collected and recycled exceeded the
statutory targets by significant amounts.10 However, the huge amounts of paper and
plastics recycled could not be absorbed by end-use markets within Germany, and so
the surpluses had to be exported. Thus, foreign markets were suddenly flooded by
these products, putting domestic recycling plants in these countries, which do not
enjoy subsidization of their activities, in disadvantage in relation to the cheap German
exports. According to press reports, several paper companies in England have gone
bankrupt because they cannot compete with the subsidized recycled paper coming
from Germany.11 British paper companies are reported to have demanded a 60
million-pound subsidy from their government, as part of a voluntary agreement to
save them from closure. However, while the problem within the European
Community was soon solved by mutual agreement between the Member Countries,
and the issuing of a directive by the EC Council and Parliament, aimed at
harmonizing recycling schemes among the member Countries,12 the problem for third
countries still remain. Hence, significant amounts of recycled plastics, paper and
corrugated carton are exported at cheap prices to developing countries in the Middle
East and Asia.13 Injured recycling plants in those countries are highly unlikely to
receive subsidies from their governments, nor to enjoy the benefits of a mandated
recycling scheme, such as that of Germany. Instead, their more probable response
would be to abandon expensive collection and sorting of local waste, and to try to
9

E. Johnson, “Making Plastics Recycling Pay”, European Chemical News 22-28 January 1996, p. 18:
“For plastic packaging, the DSD – through its subsidiary Deutche Kunststoff Recycling (DKR) – pays
extra to cover the cost of recycling. Last year it paid DM 330m for 460,000 tonne of recyclate
produced, i.e. an average of DM 720/tonne. The DKR also manages the movement of waste from
sorting plants through the rest of the recycling loop.” On the DKR’s website, these payments are even
referred to as “recycling subsidies”. See http://www.dkr.de/1026.html
10
Raymond, supra note 7, page 3. In 1994, instead of collecting 30%, the plastic industry was
recycling closer to 80%. This tendency has continued most of the time since then. In the year 2000,
more than 93% of the plastic packaging was recycled. See information on the official website of the
DSD’s subsidiary in charge of recycling in the plastic industry, Deutsche Gesellschaft für KunststoffRecycling mbh (DKR): http://www.dkr.de/860.html (visited May 16, 2001). For information on the
targets exceeded in other sectors, see the website of DSD: http://www.gruener-punkt.de/en.
11
Raymond, supra note 7, pages 4-5.
12
Directive 94/62/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 1994, Official
Journal No L 365/10 (31/12/94). This directive is based on Article 100a of the EC Treaty, aims to
harmonize national measures concerning the management of packaging and packaging waste. The
objective of the directive is not only pure environmental, but also “to ensure the functioning of the
internal market and to avoid obstacles to trade as well as distortions and restrictions of competition
within the Community” (emphasis added). This objective surely echoes the problems described in the
text and the intra-Community tension that followed from them. Article 6(1) of the directive lays down,
inter alia, quantified targets to be achieved by Member States for recovery and of packaging waste.
Article 6(1)(a) establishes that, no later than 30 June 2001, between 50 % as a minimum and 65 % as a
maximum by weight of the packaging waste will be recovered.
13
Raymond, supra note 7, page 9.
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obtain a contract from the DSD to recycle German waste, and in some cases to even
receive subsidies from the DSD in order to perform this task.
The case of the plastic recycling sector in Israel can serve as a good example.
Amnir Recycling Industries Ltd. was the pioneer in Israel in the field of recycling and
the leading firm involved in the recycling of paper and plastic. Until the cheap
imports from Germany started, the company was manufacturing about 80% of the
recycled plastic (mainly polyethylene) consumed in Israel.14 The plastic waste that
served as its raw material was collected from industrial plants around the country and
from farmers who used it for greenhouses. After manufacturing, the recycled
polyethylene was sold to the local industry to be used in the manufacture of pipes and
plastic bags. When the influx of cheap imports from Germany started in 1996, Amnir
was forced to lower its prices and to sell sometimes under cost. The firm nevertheless
experienced a sharp decline in its sales, and it was consequently forced to reduce its
collection activities (and to lay off some of the collection staff) as well as its
production (recycling).
The firm turned to the Ministry of Industry and Trade, to the unit in charge of
anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations, complaining that the polyethylene from
Germany is in fact subsidized and therefore amounts to unfair trade. After consulting
its legal advisor, the Ministry responded that it is unable to commence investigations
for suspected subsidized imports, due to the fact that the payments allegedly received
by the German manufacturer from the DKR (a subsidiary of DSD) do not amount to
“subsidies” under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(the “SCM Agreement”).15 After reviewing the facts, the Ministry suggested that the
firm consider the possibility of filing an anti-dumping complaint instead. Such a
complaint was indeed filed and investigations were commenced. The Ministry even
imposed provisional anti-dumping duties, based on prima facie evidence of dumping
– i.e., sales at export prices that are lower than the normal price in Germany (price
discrimination). However, the final instance, the Trade Levies Committee, reached the
conclusion that there was no clear evidence of significant dumping, and that the
dumping margin fell below the de minimis threshold. It did however find signs of
material injury to Amnir as a result of the imports. In summing up its conclusions, the
Committee stated as follows:16
Since it has not been found that the imports from Germany have
been sold at dumped prices, one cannot link this injury to dumped
14

The details are taken from the decision of Israel’s Trade Levies Committee, the tribunal in charge of
Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties procedures, in the complaint of Amnir regarding Dumped
Imports of Recycled Polyethylene from Germany, Decision No. 3 in Collection of Decisions of
Advisory Committee for Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties 1998-2001 (Ministry of Industry and
Trade, Trade Levies Unit) (in Hebrew) 77. The author served at the time as the Chairman of the
Committee. The decision, as well as all other decisions of the Committee (in Hebrew), can be
downloaded from the website of the Ministry of Industry and Trade:
http://www.moit.gov.il/dumping.htm. For a discussion in English of Israel’s Anti-dumping and
Countervailing Duties procedures, see Arie Reich, "Institutional and Substantive Reform of the
Antidumping and Subsidy Agreements: Lessons from the Israeli Experience", 37 Journal of World
Trade (Vol. 6) 1037 (2003).
15
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, reprinted in The Results of the Uruguay
Round, supra note 3, at 264. The definition of “subsidy” is found in Article 1 of the Agreement, and
will be discussed further in section C below.
16
Amnir Decision, supra note 14, page 111 (the author’s translation).
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imports. Indeed, according to the picture that has emerged before us, the
massive influx of polyethylene from Germany originates not from sales at
dumped prices, but from the fact that in Germany large surpluses of
recycled polyethylene have accumulated that are seeking markets in
foreign countries, and that this material can be sold to these countries
(despite the high transportation costs) as a result of the generous support
of the DKR company to the German manufacturer. This support is
manifested, as we have seen, in two components: the provision of free raw
material (without the need to bear expenses in connection with collection
and sorting of the plastic containers); and significant support payments.
The reason that these increased imports perhaps ought to turn on
a warning light lies in their environmental impact. If indeed, they bring
about a reduction in the local production of recycled polyethylene – as
indicated by our findings – then it must also cause a reduction in the
collection and recycling of plastic waste after industrial or agricultural
use. If this waste is not collected and recycled, then it is bound to be
disposed at best at the landfills, or at worse, in nature. Of course, the
imports from Germany do not cause any reduction in the recycling of post
consumer plastic waste, due to the simple reason that in Israel there is
still no organized collection and recycling of such waste.17 However, if in
the future such recycling would be contemplated, it is definitely possible
that the cheap imports from Germany may prevent such recycling or may
make it economically unfeasible. But as mentioned, the imports do appear
to be the cause of the reduction in recycling of industrial and agricultural
plastic waste. However, the solution to this problem is not in the hands of
this Committee, and the remedy to these injuries, if indeed they are
caused, is not anti-dumping duties. It would seem to us that the Ministry
of Environment ought to put its mind to this problem, and the sooner the
better.
In practice, the Ministry of Environment, while recognizing the problem and the
detrimental effect the imports from Germany could have on the Israeli
environment, especially in light of the serious situation of the country’s
landfills, considered itself unable to prevent the imports or to provide any other
assistance to the recycling industry.

C.

Privately Paid, but Governmentally Induced, Subsidies under the SCM
Agreement
1.

Are they Countervailable?

17

In the meanwhile, after the decision was given, Israel has taken legislative measures in order to
encourage recycling of consumer plastic waste. In April 1999, the Deposit Law on Beverage
Containers was adopted by the Knesset, and it came into force on October 1, 2001. These measures are
still far from reaching satisfactory levels of recycling. Containers over 1.5 liters, which are most
common, are still not covered by the Law. At most, the Law targets 60% of all the beverage containers,
and they only make up about 4% of total municipal waste and 8% of the volume (Figures taken from
the website of Israel’s Ministry of the Environment: http://www.sviva.gov.il, visited 2.9.04)).

6

On the face of it, the story of the German polyethylene exports sounds like a classic
case of countervailable subsidies. A German manufacturer receives financial support
from some national body established to promote a specific manufacturing sector in the
name of some national policy objectives. Consequently, the manufactured products
are exported at cheap prices to foreign countries, thus inflicting material injury on
domestic manufacturers of like products. Under well-established international trade
law, the domestic industry has the right to submit a complaint against the subsidized
imports, and to apply for a remedy in the form of countervailing duties imposed on
the imports, and set at an amount equivalent to the amount of the subsidy, or less.
This type of remedy was recognized as legitimate already in the 1947 General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),18 and is now regulated by the WTO SCM
Agreement.19 Why then was Amnir advised that such a complaint was impossible?

(a)

“A Financial Contribution by a Government or any Public Body”

The answer lies in the definition of the term “Subsidy” found in Article 1 of
the SCM Agreement. According to this definition, a subsidy is deemed to exist if
“there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body within the
territory of a Member … and a benefit is thereby conferred“ (emphasis added).20 A
critical component of the definition is thus that the financial contribution to the
manufacturer comes from a government or from a public body. The payments
received by the German manufacturers of recycled polyethylene do not seem to fulfill
this requirement. The DKR, who pays out the subsidies, is not a governmental
agency, nor could it be considered to be a public body. It is a privately owned
company, whose shareholders are the DSD and an amalgamation of German-based
companies and associations from the plastics producing and processing industry and
plastic machine manufacturers.21 The DSD is also privately owned by some 600
shareholders from the industry and trade.22 Thus, while all the other components of
the definition would seem to be fulfilled in this case (“a financial contribution” in the
form of “a direct transfer of funds”, and “a benefit is thereby conferred”), the
component relating to the identity of the contributor is not fulfilled. In other words,
even though the DKR itself refers to its payments as “recycling subsidies”,23 these
payments do not seem to fall into the definition of the Subsidies Agreement.

(b)

The “Private Body” Provision

Albeit, the definition allows for a certain amount of latitude in this regard, by
the addition in subsection (a)(1)(iv) of the following provision:

18

See Article VI:3 and VI:6 of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature on
October 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194; T.I.A.S. No. 1700 [hereinafter GATT].
19
Supra note 15.
20
Article 1:1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement, supra note 15.
21
Based on information from the DKR’s website: http://www.dkr.de/864.html (visited on May 19,
2001).
22
Based on information from the DSS’s website: http://www.gruenerpunkt.de/en/index.php3?choice1=ds&choice2=philosophie (visited on May 19, 2001).
23
See http://www.dkr.de/1026.html.
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“a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or
directs a private body to carry out one or more of the functions
illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which would normally be vested in the
government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices
normally followed by governments.”
This addition would seem to aim at a situation similar to our case, where the
payment is fulfilling all of the essential characteristics of a subsidy – a financial
contribution in one of the forms illustrated in subsections (i) to (iii), which confers a
benefit to the recipient – but which is made not by the government or a public body,
as required in the chapeau of the provision, but by a private body.
However, the language is quite restrictive. It requires that the private body in
such case has been directed or entrusted to carry out the financial contribution. It also
requires that this function is one which would normally be vested in the government,
and that the practice [i.e., the carrying out of the said functions] in no real sense
differs from practices normally followed by governments. What is the meaning of
these requirements? Can they be said to have been fulfilled in our case?
The answer to these questions depends on the interpretative approach taken in
relation to this provision. A strict, textual (and perhaps formalistic) approach would
require us to look for an actual and express direction or entrustment by the
government to the private body to carry out one or more of the functions illustrated in
paragraphs (i)-(iii) of Article 1.1(a)(1). A less strict approach would be willing to
consider somewhat less explicit and direct means used by governments to induce
private bodies to carry out the said functions. Such an approach could be based on a
broad understanding of the term “directs”, as including any act that regulates the
behavior of the private body or causes it to move on a particular course. It could also
be based on a purposive, teleological interpretation of the provision, which looks at its
rationale and purpose, and asks itself whether the measure in question falls within this
rationale. Thus, one may argue that the purpose of sub-paragraph (iv) is to prevent the
circumvention of paragraphs (i) to (iii) by a government, simply by acting through a
private body. It should therefore be understood to include any such act, whether it is
an express direction or entrustment, or anything else that is functionally equivalent to
such a direction or entrustment.
WTO panels, as well as the Appellate Body, usually prefer the more strict and
formalistic approach to interpretation, so as not to be accused of “judicial legislation”
or violation of Article 19.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.24 For this and
other reasons, they are therefore more likely to choose the former interpretation.25

24

The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), Annex 2
of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, reprinted in The Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts (Geneva, 1995) 404. Article 19.2 of the
DSU provides that “in their findings and recommendations, the panel and Appellate Body cannot add
to or diminish the rights provided in the covered agreements.”
25
On June 5, 2001, the author presented this paper for the first time, in an international conference
hosted by the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and predicted that WTO panels would choose the more
formalistic interpretation and require the finding of an actual and express direction by the government
to the private body. While this prediction was disputed by some of the participants in the conference,
who thought that a more functional approach could be adopted, it was confirmed only three weeks
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(c)

The Panel Report on Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies

Indeed, that is precisely what a recent WTO panel, in the matter of United
States – Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies26 - charged with the task of
interpreting paragraph (iv), did. The dispute before the panel concerned the U.S.
position that in some circumstances export restraints can be treated as subsidies and
therefore be countervailed. This will happen in a situation where an export restraint
forces the domestic producers of the restrained products to sell at depressed prices to
domestic down-the-stream manufacturers, which consequently will enjoy input at less
than world-market prices. The U.S. claimed that such measures constitute a financial
contribution to these manufacturers in the form of government-entrusted or
government-directed provision of goods in the sense of Article 1.1(a)(iii) and (iv) of
the SCM Agreement. The view of the U.S. was that a government limitation or
outright prohibition of exports of the product in question is different only semantically
from an affirmative direction to a private entity to provide goods (to a greater degree
than before or exclusively) to domestic producers.27 The panel rejected the U.S.
assertion that one should look at things "non-semantically" and include in Article
1.1(a)(iv) acts that are "functionally equivalent" to an entrustment of or direction to a
private body. The panel ruled:
"It follows from the ordinary meaning of the words "entrust" and
"direct" that the action of the government must contain a notion of
delegation (in the case of entrustment) or command (in the case of
direction). To our minds, both the act of entrusting and that of directing
therefore necessarily carry with them the following three elements: (i) an
explicit and affirmative action, be it delegation or command; (ii)
addressed to a particular party; and (iii) the object of which action is a
particular task or duty. ... We therefore do not believe that either
entrustment or direction could be said to have occurred until all of these
three elements are present." 28

(d)

A Government “entrusts or directs”

Based on this rendering of Article 1.1(a)(iv), it is quite clear that the payments
made by DKR to the recycling plants do not qualify as “subsidies” under the SCM
Agreement. One can hardly claim the DKR to have been directed or entrusted by the
German government to make the subsidy payments. There was no delegation, nor any
command to make such payment. The DKR was never the recipient of any such
direction or entrustment. Even the manufacturers who established the DKR were
later, when the Panel decision on United States – Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies,
infra note 26, was published.
26
United States – Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies – “Complaint by Canada”,
(WT/DS194/R). The Panel Report was adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body on 23 August 2001. It
has not been appealed.
27
Ibid., para. 8.22
28
Ibid., para. 8.29.
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never directed, strictly speaking, to carry out any of those functions. They were given
a choice, by the German legislator to choose between two options, one of which was
to set up a system to recycle certain percentages of primary packaging by certain
dates. For economic reasons they chose this option, and in order to perform it and to
escape fines that would be imposed on them if they failed to live up to its
requirements, they established the DKR, who in turn chose to pay the recycling plants
certain amounts of money. The sums that were paid were determined by the DKR,
and not by the government, and they were paid in order to make it economically
viable for the recycling plants to accept the task.
But what about the collection and supply of raw-material (the used packaging)
to the recycling plants? Could that be considered as provision of “goods or services
other than general infrastructure” under subparagraph (iii), which a private body (the
DKR) has been directed by the government to carry out?
Based on the strict approach of the Export Restraints panel, one could argue
that this situation is still not fulfilling the requirement of “an explicit and affirmative
action of delegation or command”,29 because it is not the provision of goods or
services to the recycling plants that the DKR or the manufacturers were commanded
to do. They were commanded to collect and to recycle, and this they could do in any
way they find fit. In the Export Restraints case, the panel stressed that the phrase
“type of functions”, used in subparagraph (iv), refers to the physical functions
identified in subparagraphs (i)-(iii), and that therefore the scope of the actions covered
by these provisions must be the same.30 The panel made this point in order to reject
the U.S. argument that the word “type” used in the provision suggests that “functions
of the general form, structure or character as those illustrated in subparagraphs (i)-(iii)
would likewise constitute the indirect provision of a financial contribution.”
Consequently, the private body must have been explicitly and affirmatively
commanded to “provide goods or services” to the producer in question. Anything else,
even though effectively similar to that, will not suffice.
On the other hand, under a more functional approach, one could argue that
there has in fact been such a commandment. The German legislator in effect
commanded the manufacturers to choose between two options, one of which was to
collect and recycle certain amounts of plastic packaging. Once they chose that option,
they were under a continuous obligation to fulfill that commandment. In that sense,
they were in a situation different from that of the restrained input producers in the
Export Restraints case. The latter were under no obligation to provide their products
to anyone. They could choose not to produce them or to produce them and not to sell
them. The German manufacturers did not have that choice. They had to collect and
they had to recycle. Since these manufacturers are not recycling plants and do not
have the tools or expertise required in order to engage in recycling, they had no choice
but to provide the collected material to recycling plants. If this provision of goods by
the DKR on behalf of the manufacturers, could be shown to confer a benefit on the
recycling plants in relation to the market,31 by virtue of the fact that the goods are
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provided to them for free, and without having to incur collection and sorting costs,32
then it could arguably qualify as a subsidy, even according to the Export Restraints
decision.

(e)
“Which would normally be vested in the government”, and “the practice, in
no real sense differs from practices normally followed by governments”
The Export Restraints panel did not really go into the question of how to
interpret the last two elements of subparagraph (iv) quoted above. While both the U.S.
and Canada submitted arguments in this regard – the U.S. arguing that these elements
in effect broaden the scope of the provision, and Canada arguing the opposite – the
panel did not consider it necessary to make any finding in this regard.33 It only
expressed its “serious doubts” regarding both of the parties’ arguments in this matter.
Here, then, we cannot rely on the panel for any guidance as to the meaning of these
two elements.
It appears that the language in this regard (at least of the second element)
originated in the 1960 report of the Panel on Review Pursuant to Article XVI:5.34 This
report discussed the question of whether subsidies financed by a non-governmental
levy had to be notified under the GATT Article XVI provisions on subsidies. The
panel noted that in general there was no obligation to notify schemes in which a group
of producers voluntarily taxed themselves in order to subsidize exports of a product.
On the other hand, the panel had no doubt that there was an obligation to notify all
schemes of levy/subsidy affecting imports or exports in which the government took a
part “either by making payments into a common fund or entrusting to a private body
the functions of taxation and subsidization with the result that the practice would in no
real sense differ from those normally followed by governments.”35 From the context,
it would seem that by using this language, the panel was trying to draw a clear
distinction between private and governmental practices. The point it was making was
that if certain functions of taxation and subsidization are practiced in a way that they
in no real sense differ from those normally followed by governments, then the fact
that the government has entrusted these functions to a private body should not make
any difference. In other words, the government cannot avoid otherwise applicable
subsidy disciplines only by using a private sector surrogate to make the financial
contributions that the government normally would have made directly. The meaning
of the “normally followed by government” requirement is thus to require an
examination of the nature of the practice in order to determine if it is essentially (“in
no real sense…”) similar to governmental practices, in which case it will be
considered as such.
The same applies in principle to this language as it was adopted into Article
1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement. One needs to examine the nature of the function
32

Under the German system, the DSD contracts and pays private waste management firms to take care
of the collection and sorting of the used plastic packaging and to supply it to the recycling plants
employed by the DKR.
33
Ibid., para. 8.59.
34
Review Pursuant to Article XVI:5, Report of the Panel, L/1160, adopted 24 May 1960 (BISD
9S/188).
35
Ibid., para. 12.
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carried out by the private body, in order to determine whether it fulfills the two
specified requirements, which would indicate its “governmental” qualities. It is not
enough that the private body has been directed or entrusted by the government to
fulfill any of the functions in question; otherwise the use of this language would be
redundant. Apparently, the drafters of the provision wanted to make sure that the
definition of subsidies would apply only where the financial contribution or provision
of goods or services by the private body was genuinely governmental in its nature. To
that effect, they directed us to examine two parameters: the nature of the function
itself (whether it is one that is normally vested in the government), and the manner in
which the practice is carried out by the private entity (whether it in no real sense
differs from practices normally followed by governments).
Turning to the first of these parameters, one could ask oneself when is a
function one that is “normally” vested in the government? Is this a factual question
determined according to whether most of the governments around the world are
vested with that function? If so, it would seem to require factual evidence on the
practice among the majority of governments in this regard, to be brought before the
panel in case of a dispute. Or perhaps it is determined in relation to some commonly
accepted standard of what functions are normally vested with governments.36 The
latter approach raises other problems, such as whether such a standard exists? How
would one establish it? And whether it isn’t an issue that is dependent on political
culture and ideology? The proper scope of government intervention in the economy is
of course an issue that is widely disputed among different states and different political
theories.
These problems become quite apparent when we try to apply this parameter on
the German recycling case. Can one regard the DKR as performing a function “which
would normally be vested in the government”? Whether the function in question is the
financial contribution to private firms, so that they will agree to take care of recycling,
or whether it is the provision of collected and sorted plastic waste for free to these
firms - it is indeed a function that in some countries (in particular in the West) is
vested in the government. However, in several others it is a function performed by
private firms, and in yet more countries (in particular most of the developing
countries, where recycling is almost non-existent) it is not vested with anyone. So in
terms of the factual approach to this requirement, if it is understood to refer to the
practice among most of the governments in the world, it is doubtful that the German
case meets the requirement.
If, however, the “standard approach” is adopted, perhaps the outcome will be
different. Here one could claim that the fact that some governments lack the economic
resources or environmental awareness to take care of collection, sorting and recycling
of waste does not mean that the proper standard for government functions doesn’t
require such involvement, and that the function itself isn’t by its nature a government
function. If these functions can be shown to be providing a “public good” (in the
sense that they are benefiting the entire public and are non-excludable37), and that
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Websters New World College Dictionary defines the term “normal” as “conforming with or
constituting an accepted standard, model or pattern” (3rd ed., 1996) 925.
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such goods therefore entails the problem of “free riders”, which justify the involvement of government.
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they are non-profitable and can therefore only be performed by private firms if the
government has stepped in and provided proper financial incentives or legal sanctions,
then this could be seen as a function that normally, by accepted standard, is vested in
the government. Recycling usually fulfills all these criteria.
It is, however, questionable whether a WTO panel would adopt the “standard”
approach, due to its potentially controversial nature. It seems more likely that the
factual approach, which is more value-neutral, would be adopted. In order to make
this approach more helpful, a panel could lighten the burden of proof as to the
normal/common usage among governments, and deem it to have been satisfied if at
least a significant number of governments have been shown to be vested with the
function in question. In such case, perhaps the German case could meet this
requirement.
The final obstacle is the last sentence of this provision, which requires that the
practice of the DKR, whereby it makes these financial contributions, “in no real sense
differs from practices normally followed by governments.” Here again, the outcome
may depend on the interpretive approach taken.
From the reasoning of the Export Restraints panel, it appears that it understands
this requirement to refer to the delegation to private parties not only of the
government function of expenditure of revenue (i.e. the “financial contribution”), but
also of the collection of revenues (i.e., taxation).38 This would seem to mean that for
the function fulfilled by the private body to “in no real sense differ from practices
normally followed by governments”, it would have to include both some type of
taxation, as well as the payment of the subsidy. Only this would make the actions of
the private body similar to the functions of sovereign governments whereby they
collect revenues and expend them. Such a reading would narrow considerably the
scope of the private body provision. It also appears to read into it elements that are not
included in the provision. Article 1.1 refers only to the “financial contribution”
function - whether in the form of direct transfer of funds, foregoing of government
revenues or provision of goods or services - and nowhere is there any mentioning of
the collection of revenues to finance such contributions. To apply such a requirement
See “Prisoners’ Dilemma and the Theory of the State”, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
and the Law (London: Macmillan, 1998), 100.
38
The Panel quotes a paper prepared by the GATT Secretariat at the request of the Negotiating Group
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures during the Uruguay Round leading up to the conclusion of
the SCM Agreement. The Panel notes that the inclusion of government transfers effected through nongovernmental agents closely reflects a view expressed prior to the Uruguay Round by a Group of
Experts on the Calculation of the Amount of a Subsidy (a body operating under the Tokyo Round
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures), which was quoted in the Secretariat paper. The
paper is quoted as follows: “It is suggested that there can be no subsidy in the absence of a financial
contribution by government, or in other words that a subsidy presupposes such a contribution. Such an
approach would seem to be useful to the extent that it underlines that there is a necessary link between
a subsidy and the taxation function of government, exercised either directly or delegated to other,
private bodies… There may be similar situations in which a government chooses to direct a private
body to carry out certain functions related to the sovereign right of governments to collect revenues and
expend them.” (para. 8.71 of the Export Restraints Panel Report, supra note 26
). The Panel noted that
it found very significant the Group of Experts’ interpretation that the 1960 Panel’s reference to
“practice …in no real sense different from those normally followed by governments” was “a general
reference to the delegation to private parties of the particular government functions of taxation and
expenditure of revenue, and not a reference to government market interventions in the general sense, or
the effects thereof.” (Ibid., para. 8.72).
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to the private body provision, when it expressly refers solely to the “type of functions
illustrated in (i) to (iii) above”, and not to any other governmental functions, would
seem to go beyond its ordinary meaning. It would therefore not be in line with the
Vienna Convention’s demand that a treaty be interpreted “in good faith according
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty…”39
If nevertheless this interpretation would be employed, it would most probably
exclude the German case from the definition of “subsidies”. The reason is that unlike
governments, the DKR does not impose any mandatory taxes in order to finance its
subsidization of certain recycling plants. The source of its finances are better
characterized as commercial fees, paid by manufacturers for the right to put the
“Green Dot” symbol on their package, and in exchange for collection and recycling
services provided on their behalf by the DKR.
A more likely interpretation of the requirement in question is that it deals solely
with the financial contribution function performed by the private body, and refers to
the manner and the objectives for which it is carried out. In other words, there must be
some governmental attributes to the practice in question, so that the fact that it is done
by a private entity becomes essentially irrelevant, because the practice in no real sense
differs from practices normally followed by governments. One essential feature of
government practices is that they are not profit-motivated. Governments decide upon
a policy objective, which in their opinion is worthy of subsidization, determine
objective standards on how to disburse the subsidies, to whom and how much, and
then proceed to act accordingly.
Here one could argue that there are certain “governmental” attributes to the
activities of national associations, such as the DKR and the DSD. They have been
established pursuant to, or following, legislation aimed to achieve certain national
objectives. Their goals are to achieve those objectives, and even though they are nongovernmental bodies, they are usually not profit-motivated, but function as non-profit
organizations. They pay their subsidies to recycling plants not in return for any direct
consideration from those plants, but in return for the attainment through those plants
of those national objectives of waste recycling. The subsidies are probably paid to the
various plants according to some predetermined objective standards (for instance,
volumes of waste recycled). Based on these arguments, one could therefore credibly
argue that the “financial contribution” function carried out by such private bodies “in
no real sense differs from practices followed by governments”.

(f)

Conclusion

What I have tried to show in my above discussion of Article 1(a)(1)(iv)of the SCM
Agreement is that a purposive, teleological interpretation of this provision, which
looks at its rationale and purpose, could permit us to consider the payments and free
39

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969), Article 31.1 (“General rule of
interpretation”). The WTO Appellate Body has repeatedly ruled that this general rule of interpretation
has attained the status of a rule of customary or general international law and as such should guide the
WTO panels in the interpretation of WTO agreements. See e.g. United States – Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20
May 1996, p. 16.
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services that recycling plants receive under the German recycling scheme (and its
likes) as “subsidies” under the SCM Agreement. It is however questionable, in view
of the strict and somewhat formalistic interpretative approach reflected generally in
WTO panel decisions, whether such an interpretation will in fact be adopted by a
WTO panel. Considering in particular the Export Restraints Case, it does not seem
likely that panels will be willing to extend the “private body” provision of SCM
Agreement Article 1 to include such payments or services. If that is the case, they
could not be subject to any countervailing duty investigation or imposition, even if the
products manufactured by these plants and imported into another country cause
material injury to the importing country’s domestic industry and to its environment.40

2.

Should they be Countervailable under the SCM Agreement? – A
Normative Analysis and Proposed Amendment
The conclusion of the previous section, according to which a WTO member is
probably precluded from using countervailing duties in order to prevent the
collapse of its recycling scheme as a result of privately subsidized recycling
schemes of other countries, leads us to ask whether this is a desirable situation,
or whether the SCM Agreement ought to be amended in this regard. To be
more precise, we would like to question the logic and utility of the restrictive
language of the SCM Agreement’s definition of “subsidies”. The discussion
will focus on subparagraph (iv) of Article 1.1(a)(1), namely the provision
dealing with subsidization by a funding mechanism or private body.
We can derive some guidance in this regard by examining the rationale
of countervailing duties, and of the permission given by GATT since its
inception in 1947 to use such measures.41 A countervailing duty is defined by
the SCM Agreement as “a special duty levied for the purpose of offsetting any
subsidy bestowed directly or indirectly upon the manufacture, production or
export of any merchandise”.42 Such a duty may be imposed if it is found, after
due investigation, that the said merchandise when imported into the imposing
country causes material injury, or threat of injury, to its domestic industry.
Since the advantage enjoyed by the foreign producer, which allows her to
charge less for her merchandise than the domestic industry, is not a result of a
genuine comparative advantage, i.e., greater efficiency, but of the subsidies she
receives, this represents a distortion of the market mechanism. The domestic
producer is therefore seen as justified when he claims that he is unable to
compete on such terms, and that global efficiency will not be served by his exit
40

The SCM Agreement makes a clear link between Part V of the Agreement, dealing with
Countervailing Duties, and the rest of the Agreement. Thus, Article 10 provides that countervailing
duties may only be imposed pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the SCM Agreement. Such investigation can only be initiated upon a written application
on behalf of the industry that includes sufficient evidence on the existence of “a subsidy” (Article 11.1
and 11.2). Thus, if the subject matter of the application does not meet the definition of the term
“subsidy” under Article 1 of the SCM Agreement, a WTO Member Country may not initiate a
countervailing duty investigation upon such an application, and is therefore precluded from imposing
any countervailing duty on imports receiving such “non-subsidies”.
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See Article VI:3 of the GATT, supra note 18.
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from the market. From this point of view, the question of whether the financial
contribution received by the foreign producer originates from a governmental
agency, or from a private body that is induced, directly or indirectly, by
legislation to make such a contribution, is completely irrelevant. What matters
is that the low prices charged by the foreign producer do not represent a
genuine efficiency advantage, and do not indicate that the domestic producers
have room to improve their efficiency. Under such circumstances,
countervailing duties (set at no more than the amount of the subsidy) can be
seen as offsetting this artificial advantage and restoring the “level playing field”
between the various producers.43
Many economists have argued against the rationale of countervailing
duties - from the point of view of the imposing country, not from a global
perspective – claiming that it is a very unwise response by the importing
country. They argue that if a government of a foreign country wishes to
subsidize the exports to an importing country, the latter – or at least its
consumers – should be grateful for the gift they have received.44 This bounty
necessarily benefits the consumers more than what it harms the domestic
producers, so the country as a whole is better off than in the absence of the
subsidy. However, even these critics would be able to justify the imposition of
countervailing duties, when what’s at stake is the environment of the importing
country, and the “material injury” is inflicted not just on the business of the
domestic producers, but also on the importing country’s ability to collect and
recycle its waste. Under such circumstances, the external costs caused by the
harm to the environment join with the costs of the domestic industry, and
together they outweigh the benefit of the consumers from cheap imports. A
countervailing duty, equal to the amount of the subsidy received by the foreign
recycling plant (or less, if a lesser duty may suffice45), would restore the ability
of the domestic recycling plant to compete with the imports and thus continue
its operation under fair, but competitive, conditions. Provided the duty is set at
the proper level, this would seem to be a remedy superior to an outright
prohibition on the importation, since it would retain the competitive pressure on
the domestic plant, thus insuring its continued efficiency and preventing it from
establishing a monopoly.
The rationale behind the permission to act against actionable subsidies
would seem to apply to the same extent regardless of whether the subsidies are
paid by a governmental agency or by a private body induced to do so by the
43

That the object of the SCM Agreement is to prevent distortions of the market has been recognized by
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government. What matters is the fact that the recipient of the subsidies has been
placed in a situation more advantageous than under regular market conditions,
and that this has caused material injury to another party.
In the Canada Aircraft case, the WTO Appellate Body confirmed the
position of a panel that rejected the “cost to government” test in relation to the
definition of subsidies, and instead adopted the market test as the proper
benchmark for determining whether a “benefit” has been conferred.46
Accordingly, a subsidy is deemed to confer a benefit, under Article 1 of the
SCM Agreement, if it is provided on terms that are more advantageous than
those that would have been available to the recipient on the market.47 In
rejecting Canada’s position, according to which what matters in the
determination of a benefit is the cost to the government that is claimed to have
paid subsidies, the Appellate Body notes that such a position would exclude
those situations where a “benefit” is conferred by a private body under the
direction of a government.48 Since such situations are expressly included in the
definition of subsidies under Article 1, Canada’s position could not be
accepted. These decisions are of course based primarily on a textual analysis of
Article 1, and relate to the element of “benefit”, not to the “financial
contribution” element. Therefore, they cannot lead us to a different conclusion
than that which we arrived at in the previous section, namely that it is
questionable whether the financial contributions made under the German
recycling scheme can qualify as “subsidies” under the definition of the SCM
Agreement. However, the economic logic that they reflect seem to apply
equally regardless of whether the private body that has made the financial
contribution to the manufacturer, and thereby conferred a benefit on it, has been
expressly directed or entrusted by the government to do so, or whether it has
been induced to do so by legislation that leaves it only inferior alternatives.
Under the same logic, it would also be irrelevant whether, when making the
contribution, this body was performing a function “which would normally be
vested in the government” or not. Likewise it would not matter whether the
body is following practices that “in no real sense differ from practices normally
followed by governments.” What does matter is the fact that the body is making
financial contributions to manufacturers, which it would not make in the
absence of government intervention, and that these manufacturers derive a
benefit – in relation to normal market conditions - from these contributions. It
is therefore hard to understand why such contributions should not be included
in the definition of “subsidies” under the SCM Agreement. It would also seem
to open a potential loophole for governments interested in circumventing the
provisions of this Agreement.
Take for instance the case of the Government of Urbania who wishes to
subsidize manufacturers of, say, semi-conductors, which is a new sector in its
economy. Following legal advice, it passes a law that requires the
manufacturers of widgets – a strong and well-established industry – to ensure
that the annual production of semi-conductors within Urbania will increase
46
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steadily by 20% each year over a period of the next five years. Failure to reach
the required targets will result in fines. In order to comply with the new law, the
Urbania Association of Widget Manufacturers (UAWM) enters into contracts
with newly established manufacturers of semi-conductors, wherein the former
undertakes to make financial contributions to the latter in order to help them to
establish their production facilities, increase their production and exports, and
meet the statutory targets. Since the widget sector is a strong and wellestablished sector (and perhaps also enjoys natural or artificial protection from
imports), it is able to finance these undertakings by raising the prices of widgets
in the local market. Under the existing SCM Agreement, the neighboring
Ruritania is precluded from instituting countervailing duty proceedings, or to
submit a complaint to the WTO, against the increased imports from Urbania of
low-priced semi-conductors, even if these cause material injury to its domestic
semi-conductor industry.
One could also change the facts of the hypothetical, so that instead of
inducing the widget sector to subsidize the semi-conductor sector by means of
legislation, it is done through bargaining. If, for instance, the Government of
Urbania offer the widget sector tax breaks in return for its undertaking to ensure
the gradual growth of the semi-conductor sector, the financial contributions
received by the latter would still probably remain outside of the scope of
Article 1 of the SCM Agreement. The UAWM has not been directed, nor
entrusted, to make those payments, and it is unclear whether they are functions
that would normally be vested in the government.49 It is also questionable
whether one could consider the practice followed by this body, as one that in no
real sense differs from practices normally followed by governments. It is even
questionable whether the tax breaks given to the widget sector may qualify as a
subsidy to this sector, considering that these tax breaks may have been offset by
the costs of the financial contributions made to the semi-conductor sector.
Hence, even though the requirement that there be a “financial contribution” is
met,50 the “benefit” requirement may not be.51 It may also be the case that the
widgets aren’t exported at all to Ruritania, and therefore cannot be
countervailed, and even if they were, the cause of the material injury is the
semi-conductors – not the widgets.
These hypotheticals help to illustrate the illogic of the restrictive
definition of subsidies in the SCM Agreement, and in particular of the “private
body” provision. Since the drafters of the provision clearly had understood that
governments could use private bodies in order to channel subsidies through
them to selected beneficiaries, they ought to have realized that such use could
be made by means more subtle than express directions carried out with
governmental attributes. What should count is the fact that there is a
governmentally induced subsidy by direct transfer of funds, which makes no
commercial sense per se (in the absence of the governmental interference), and
which confers a benefit on the recipient in relation to the market. The definition
should therefore have been formulated in such a way as to prevent the
49
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possibility of evading the provisions of the SCM Agreement simply by
transferring the subsidizing function to a private body.
A revised definition of the “private body provision”, should be based on
a different characterization of such a subsidization, namely: (1) The fact that
the financial contribution is “governmentally induced”, i.e., that it is made by
reason of a governmental decree or direction; (2) The fact that the private body
that makes the contribution does not receive any real consideration for its
payment, in the form of goods or services; and (3) The fact that the financial
contribution is granted on the manufacture of a product by another private firm
that sells its product on the market, and not to the payer of the contribution.52
It should be stressed in this regard, that the types of subsidies we are
discussing here are in any case not prohibited per se. Since they are not
contingent upon export performance, nor upon the use of domestic over
imported goods,53 they could at most be considered under the category of
“actionable” subsidies of the SCM Agreement.54 This means that they could
give rise to a cause of action only if they cause adverse effects to the interest of
other countries, such as injury to their domestic industry or other serious
prejudice, as defined in the Agreement.55 (They would also have to be
“specific” in accordance with Article 2 of the Agreement.)56 The proposed
revision of Article 1 would therefore not affect purely domestic subsidy
schemes with no adverse effects on other countries. If, however, the product
enjoying the private subsidy is exported to other countries and cause material
injury, and if it is “specific”, it may give rise to countervailing duty
investigations in those countries (or to complaints to theD ispute Settlement
Body of the WTO, if that is a more appropriate line of action in view of the
circumstances). The status of the recipient under a revised definition would
therefore not be any different than if it had received the subsidies directly from
the government.
Coming back to the specific issue of the German recycling scheme and
the like, I am not claiming that the scheme in itself is unjustified or harmful.
52
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Waste and garbage that is not recycled clearly entail a social cost that justify
the interference of government, sometimes even by subsidies, in order to
remedy the market failure. The problem emerges when the waste or the
recycled products are exported to other countries and only under circumstances
where they cause harm to the recycling industry and environment of those
countries. In such circumstances, it would seem that the optimal remedy for the
importing country that is suffering the harm is to use countervailing duties to
offset the benefit of the subsidy or the injury – regardless of whether the
subsidy is paid by the government or by a private body induced to do so by the
government. Such a response will not invalidate the subsidized recycling
scheme of the exporting country, nor cause it to be repealed, but only remedy
some of its harmful side-effects. The harmful exports are usually only a small
fraction of the entire production, and to the extent that the countervailing duties
will reduce the quantities of those, this is unlikely to cause significant problems
to the German recycling plants. There is also the possibility that these exports
will find alternative markets where they do not cause any harm.

3.

Harm to the Environment as “Adverse Effect”
Another notable deficiency in the SCM Agreement that is illustrated by our case, is
the fact that the definition of “adverse effects” – a condition for a subsidy to be
considered “actionable” – does not include harm to the environment. The relevant
provision, namely Article 5 of the SCM Agreement, provides:
No Member should cause, through the use of any subsidy referred to in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 1, adverse effects to the interests of other
Members, i.e.:
(a)
(b)

(c)

injury to the domestic industry of another Member;
nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or
indirectly to other Members under GATT 1994 in particular
the benefits of concessions bound under Article II of GATT
1994;
serious prejudice to the interest of another Member.

All three of these alternative definitions of “adverse effects” appear to refer only to
various harms to the commercial interests of other Members, and not to any other
interest. The first refers expressly to injury to the industry of another Member.57 The
second, refers to the term “nullification or impairment of benefits”, that is also found
at the basis of GATT’s provisions on dispute resolution (Article XXIII).58 The GATT
1994 is an agreement on international trade. Hence, the benefits accruing to other
Members under it are usually commercial benefits, i.e., benefits to the export or
57

Footnote 11 to this provision leaves no room for doubt, when it provides that the term “injury” is
used here in the same sense as it is used in Part V. That means that the very precise provisions of
Article 15 of the SCM Agreement, pertaining to the determination of injury, will apply here too.
According to this provision, injury relates clearly to negative effect on the domestic producers.
58
Article XXIII of GATT 1994, supra note 18 (“Nullification or Impairment”).

20

import-substituting activities of their domestic producers. Since GATT 1994 does not
include the protection of the environment as one of its objectives,59 a Member State
has poor chances to be heard in claiming that one of the benefits accruing to it under
this agreement is that its environment not be harmed. The particular example quoted
in this second alternative, namely “the benefits of concessions bound under Article II
of GATT 1994”, which refer to tariff concessions, also point to the same conclusion.
Finally, the third alternative definition refers to “serious prejudice to the interest of
another Member”. Literally, this wording could have included prejudice to noncommercial interests. However, footnote 13 to this provision appear to preclude such
a reading when it provides that the term “serious prejudice” is used here in the same
sense as it is used in paragraph 1 of Article XVI of GATT 1994.60 From the
negotiation history of this provision we learn that paragraph 1 of Article XVI was
drawn from Article 25 of the Havana Charter,61 and that its original intention was
“prejudice to the trade of a member”.62 Again, the narrow scope of the legitimate
interests covered by the original GATT agreement (as distinct from the WTO
Agreement) would also lead to the same conclusion.
This situation – or at least the possibility that such an interpretation will be
given to Article 5 – is unsatisfactory and requires amendment. As has been illustrated
by the examples discussed in this paper, subsidies of one Member can cause harm not
only to the commercial interests of another Member, but also to its environment.
Considering that the WTO has declared its commitment to sustainable development,
and to the protection and preservation of the environment,63 and to the fact that the
SCM Agreement itself includes some implicit recognition of the importance of these
objectives,64 one can see no reason why such harm should not be expressly included
in the definition of “adverse effects”. Such an amendment would be part of the
desired “Greening of the GATT” and could be effected by using the amendment
procedure provided for in Article X of the WTO Agreement.65
Alternatively, the WTO could use its authority to adopt a binding
interpretation of any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements pursuant to Article IX of
59

The objective of “sustainable development, seeking to protect and preserve the environment and to
enhance the means of doing so” is included in the 1st preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, reprinted in The Results of the Uruguay Round, supra note
3, p. 6. However, it is not part of the GATT 1994, as this agreement is defined in Article 1 of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. It consists of the provisions of GATT 1947, and various
other amending legal instruments, but not including the WTO Agreement.
60
See footnote 13 to the SCM Agreement, supra note 15.
61
The Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization. The negotiation of the Charter took
place during 1946-1948, but the Charter never entered into force. Some of its provisions served as the
basis for GATT 1947.
62
See Analytical Index – Guide to GATT Law and Practice (6th ed.) (Geneva: GATT, 1994) 411 and
416 (based on the report of the Preparatory Committee on its discussions in London on the ITO
Charter). The various panel reports that have discussed the term “serious prejudice” also related to
prejudice to commercial interests of other states (ibid.).
63
See note 59 above.
64
See Article 8.2 of the SCM Agreement, supra note 15, which defines assistance to promote
adaptation of existing facilities to new environmental requirements as a non-actionable subsidy.
65
Supra, note 59. According to this provision, such an amendment could be proposed by any Member
of the WTO, or by the Council of Trade in Goods, by submitting such proposal to the Ministerial
Conference. The decision to amend would have to be taken by the Ministerial Conference, in
accordance with the various options provided for in Article X.
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the WTO Agreement.66 This procedure was used recently in relation to a disputed
provision of the TRIPs Agreement.67 In our case, it would require a recommendation
by the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures followed by a decision
taken by a three-quarters majority of the members within the General Council or the
Ministerial Conference, according to which the words “adverse effects to the interests
of other Members” in Article 5 of the SCM Agreement would be declared to include
harm to such Members’ environment.

D.

Can an Importing Country Find Remedy under Article XX of GATT?
An alternative remedy for the country whose recycling activities have been hampered
by imports can be found if the protective measures could be permitted under Article
XX of the GATT. This is a “General Exceptions” provision that has been the focus of
much of the trade and environment debate and dispute resolution.68 When the
provision is successfully invoked, it can grant an exemption from any of the
GATT/WTO obligations. Thus, a Member State can, for instance, decide to bar the
importation of waste for recycling, or of recycled waste, if it considers such imports to
harm the collection and recycling of its own waste, and try to invoke one of the
Article XX exceptions in order to justify such a decision. Alternatively, it could limit
such importation by a quota, or impose some type of import tax on it (such as a
countervailing duty). All of these actions are generally prohibited under GATT,
unless they can be justified under Article XX.69
The discussion of the possibility of invoking one of the GATT Article XX
exceptions is relevant not only to the GATT/WTO regime, but also to many other
bilateral and regional trade agreements. The reason for this is that many of these
66

According to Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement, the Ministerial Conference and the General
Council shall have the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of the WTO Agreement itself and of
any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, a term which includes the SCM Agreement. Since this
agreement is included in Annex 1, it would require a recommendation by “the Council overseeing the
functioning of that Agreement”, which is the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
67
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)DEC/W/2 of 14.11.01, found
on the WTO website: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/min01_e/mindecl_tripts_e.htm
68
The much celebrated tuna-dolphin controversy centered around this provision. The controversy was
the subject of two GATT disputes and panel decisions: United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna
B.I.S.D. 39th Supp. 155 (1992); and United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna 33 I.L.M. 839
(1994), none of which were adopted by the General Council of GATT. The literature on this dispute is
vast. See, e.g., Ted McDorman, “The 1991 US-Mexico GATT Panel Report On Tuna and Dolphin:
Implications for Trade and Environmental Conflicts” 17 North Carolina J. Int’l L. and Com. Reg. 461
(1991); Steve Charnowitz, “Environmentalism Confronts GATT Rules”, 27 J. World Trade 37 (1993);
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, “International Trade Law and International Environmental Law, 27 J. World
Trade 43 (1993); S.T. Spracker & D. Lundsgaard, “Dolphins and Tuna: Renewed Attention on the
Future of Free Trade and Protection of the Environment” 18 Col. J. of Env. L. 385 (1993). Later, the
controversy was raised again in the shrimp-turtle case before a WTO panel: United States – Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Panel, WT/DS2/R (1996); Report of
the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R (1998). This report was adopted by the DSB.
69
Barring imports of any goods from a WTO Member State, or limiting them by an import quota, is
contrary to Article XI of GATT, which prohibits the use of any prohibitions or restrictions other than
duties, taxes or other charges, on the importation of any product from another Member State. Imposing
an import tax on such goods is also prohibited if it exceeds the bound tariff rate included in the tariff
schedule of the importing state, unless it is permitted under other provisions of the GATT/WTO
regime.
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international trade regimes incorporate the Article XX exceptions by express or
implicit reference. This is the case, for instance, with the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA),70 the Israel-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,71 and many other
bilateral trade agreements.72
In order to qualify for an Article XX exception, the measure in question must
not be applied “in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade”. This provision is commonly referred to as
the “chapeau”. It also needs to fit into one of the subparagraphs of Article XX. The
proper sequence of steps for carrying out an analysis under Article XX, according to
the case law of the WTO Appellate Body,73 is to first find provisional justification by
reason of characterization of the measure under one of the paragraphs (a) to (j), and
then to proceed to further appraisal of the same measure under the Article XX
chapeau. The Appellate Body has stated that this approach is necessary because
whether a measure constitutes "arbitrary discrimination" or "unjustifiable
discrimination," or a "disguised restriction on international trade," will depend on
which category of measures, under paragraphs (a) to (j), the measure at issue falls
under.74
The paragraphs that are potentially relevant in our case, as well as in most
other cases involving environmental disputes, are paragraphs (b) and (g).
1.

Article XX(b): “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health”

Article XX(b) relates to measures that are “necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health”. This provision can be relevant to our case, only if it can be
shown that the reduction in collection and recycling of waste in the importing country,
as a result of the imports, may harm the life or health of humans, animals or plants.
This could be the case, if, as a result of the imports, waste is left or thrown away in
the nature where it may harm the health of humans, animals or plants, especially if it
is poisonous or otherwise hazardous material. Even in such a case, however, one
would have to show that the import measure taken by the importing country is
“necessary”, in accordance with the interpretation given to this requirement in WTO
case-law, meaning that it is the least trade-distorting measure reasonably available to
the importing country in order to solve this problem. This issue shall be discussed
further below.75
70

See the North American Free Trade Agreement, 32 I.L.M. 289 and 605 (1993), Article 2101:1,
which provides: “GATT Article XX and its interpretative notes, or any equivalent provision of a
successor agreement to which all Parties are party, are incorporated into and made part of this
Agreement.”
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Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area between the Government of Israel and the
Government of the United States of America, 24 I.L.M. 653 (1985), Article 7.
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See e.g. Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the State
of Israel, (S.C. 1996, Ch. 33), Article 10.1.
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United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (1996) [the
“US-Gasoline Case”]; United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,

WT/DS58/AB/R (1998) [the “Shrimps/Turtle Case”].
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Ibid., para. 120.
Paragraph 4. See also the cases listed infra in note 101.
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2.

Article XX(g): “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources”

A perhaps more promising alternative for the importing state would be to invoke
paragraph (g). This provision exempts measures “relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption”. There are thus three elements
that have to be fulfilled: (1) that the measure is concerned with the "conservation of
exhaustible natural resources"; (2) that the measure "relat[es]” to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources; and (3) that the measure is "made effective in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption".76 We shall
now proceed to examine whether all of these three elements are fulfilled in our case.
(i)

“Concerned with Conservation of Exhaustible Natural Resources”

The measure in question is the import restriction or import tax on certain recycled
materials. This measureis aimed at promoting recycling of waste, such as used paper
or used plastic products, found within the territory of the importing country, which in
the absence of the measure will not be recycled. Paper products are made of trees and
plastic products of petroleum. Both are exhaustible natural resources, and mankind
needs to reuse and recycle these products, lest the natural resources from which they
are made be exhausted. Thus, the importing country may rightly argue that the
measure it has taken is concerned with the conservation of such exhaustible natural
resources. Reference could also be made here to the preamble of the WTO
Agreement, which explicitly acknowledges “the objective of sustainable
development” and the “preserv[ation] and protect[ion] of the environment”.77 As was
proclaimed by the Appellate Body in theShrimps/Turtle Case, this proves that the
Signatories to that agreement were "fully aware of the importance and legitimacy of
environmental protection as a goal of national and international policy".78 Indeed,
recycling of waste is considered all over the world as being one important component
of the sustainable development objective.79 Thus, it would seem that the first element
of paragraph (g) has been fulfilled in this case .This conclusion is of course based
upon the assumption that the aim of the import measure in question – and therefore its
“concern” - is indeed to promote recycling, and not any other (non-environmental)
goal.
One could, however, still raise the question of how a WTO Panel would relate
to a country that does not have any of the natural resources in question within its
territory (trees or petroleum). In such a case, its import measure would actually be
concerned with the conservation of exhaustible natural resources that are found
outside its own territory and within the territory of other states. This would evoke the
controversy raised by the first Tuna/Dolphin Panel, which held that Article XX(g)
76

Ibid. para. 126.
See supra note 59.
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Supra note 73,para. 128.
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See for instance Article 21 of the Implementation Plan adopted at the World Summit on Sustainable
Development held in Johannesburg, 2002, available at http://www.unep.org/wssd/ (last visited March
3, 2004).
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only permits signatories to take measures in relation to exhaustible natural resources
found within their jurisdiction.80 While the second Tuna/Dolphin Panel expressly and
forcefully rejected this interpretation,81 there is still not a final authoritative postWTO ruling on this issue, given that the Appellate Body chose to avoid it in its
Shrimps/Turtle decision.82 It is however highly unlikely that the jurisdictional
limitation read into paragraphs (b) and (g) by the first Tuna/Dolphin Panel will ever
be adopted again by any WTO tribunal, considering its feeble legal basis and
problematic political implications.83
(ii)

“Relating” to Such Conservation

Several GATT Panels have held that the term “relating to” should be taken to mean
“primarily aimed” at the conservation of natural resources.84 In the US-Gasoline
Case85, the Appellate Body appears to reserve judgment on whether it agrees with this
interpretation or not.86 In the later Shrimps/Turtle decision,87 the Appellate Body does
not raise the issue again, but only notes that the interpreter is required to examine the
relationship between the measure at stake and the legitimate policy of conserving
exhaustible natural resources. One possible type of relationship that has been
recognized by the Appellate Body is that of “ends and means”. When such
relationship was at issue in the US-Gasoline Case, the Appellate Body went on to
examine the nature of this relationship, and found that it was “substantial”. 88 When
later commenting on this case in the Shrimps/Turtle decision, the Appellate Body
stated that it had been a “close and genuine relationship of ends and means”.89 It then
went on to use this criterion, finding that the ends and means relationship between the
measure at stake and the legitimate policy of conserving an exhaustible, and, in fact,
endangered species, was observably a close and real one.90 Could this be said on the
measure in question here as well?
80

Supra, note 68,para. 5.31.
Supra, note 68,para. 5.20.
82
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It would seem that the relationship in our case is less close than those
examined by the Appellate Body in both the US-Gasoline Case and Shrimps-Turtle
Case. In the former case, the import restriction related to the very product that caused
the harm to the exhaustible natural resource (clean air), i.e. the type of gasoline that
failed to meet a certain standard of cleanliness. In the latter case, the import restriction
related to a product (shrimps) the method of harvesting of which caused harm to the
exhaustible natural resource (sea turtles). In our case, the import restriction does not
relate to the very product that causes harm to the exhaustible natural resource (trees or
petroleum), nor to one whose method of production causes such harm. It relates to a
product which, if allowed to be imported into the country (at all, or at a certain low
price), will impede the economic viability of domestic recycling, and thus may in
effect prevent such recycling. This, in turn, will have a negative effect on the aim of
conserving the exhaustible natural resources from which such products are made. If
this may be considered by a GATT Panel as a “close and genuine” enough
relationship, is hard to foresee. Clearly there is an “ends and means” relationship here.
As for the closeness and genuineness of this relationship, they should be examined
according to the special circumstances of each case. I would argue that as long as
there is a reasonable possibility that a causal connection exists between the means and
the ends, the fact that there are more than one links in the causal chain should not
make a difference: the measure at stake still “relates” to the conservation of
exhaustible resources. Of course, one would have to show that there is some likeliness
that the measure will promote such conservation, and that without it there is likely to
be less recycling and therefore less conservation. A remote possibility that this will be
the case will probably not suffice. However, the Appellate Body has also clarified that
the availability of an Article XX(g) defense does not depend on some empirical
“effects test”.91 It has conceded that the problem of determining causation is always a
difficult one, and thatin the field of conservation of exhaustible natural resources a
substantial period of time, perhaps years, may have to elapse before the effects
attributable to implementation of a given measure may be observable.92 It is therefore
enough to show that there is a reasonable relationship between the means and ends,
and that the measure in question was imposed with the goal of conservation in mind.
One would also have to show, that the measure in question is not disproportionately
wide in its scope and reach in relation to the policy objective of recycling and
conservation.93 Thus, in our case, if it is reasonable to expect that the importation of
recycled materials, in particular if these are sold at prices that are lower than those of
the domestic recycled materials, may impede collection and recycling of domestic
waste, then it is fair to say that a measure aimed at restricting such imports, or at
raising their price by imposing an import duty on them, is closely and genuinely
“related” to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.

(iii)

"Made Effective in Conjunction with Restrictions on Domestic
Production or Consumption"

The last part of Article XX(g), quoted above, is the one most likely to frustrate the
possibility of invoking it in the case at hand. The importing country is not putting, in
91
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conjunction with the import measures, any “restrictions on domestic production or
consumption”, as required by the provision. On the contrary; the import restriction is
aimed at encouraging and increasing domestic production of the recycled material
(and consequently of recycling, as such). In fact, it can be claimed to give preference
to recycling of domestic waste over foreign waste, while both are equally important to
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. This part of the provision is
therefore likely to present a serious obstacle for a country wishing to invoke it in the
circumstances described.
In the U.S. Gasoline Case, the Appellate Body held that this clause constitutes
a requirement of even-handedness in the imposition of restrictions, in the name of
conservation.94 What it says is essentially, that such restrictions must be imposed not
just in respect of imported products, but also with respect to domestic products. The
rationale behind this requirement is quite evident: if the conservation measures are
imposed only on imported products, and not on domestic ones, they are most probably
not genuine conservation measures, but rather disguised restrictions on international
trade aimed at protecting local producers. But this makes sense only when the
imported product itself, or its production process, is the cause of the harm to the
exhaustible natural resources. Then, it doesn’t matter where the product is produced,
whether abroad or in the importing country. In both cases one could expect harm to
the exhaustible natural resources, and therefore can demand that the restrictions on the
imports “are made effective in conjunction with restriction on domestic production or
consumption.” In the case at hand, however, the harm to these resources stems not
from the products themselves, nor from their production process, but rather from their
adverse economic impact on a certain domestic conservation activity.This activity is
served best in this case not by restrictions on domestic production, but, quite on the
contrary, by encouraging and protecting domestic production (= recycling of domestic
waste).
Again, we seem to be faced with a clash between form and substance, between
the black letter of the law and its spirit and intent. The lack of restrictions on domestic
production or consumption in this case is not a sign of uneven-handedness. On the
contrary; the import restriction, in particular if it is in the form of a countervailing
duty, is aimed at restoring even-handedness and equality, and to allow the
continuation of recycling activity in the importing country just like recycling is taking
place in the exporting country. Recycling in the exporting country does not have to
come at the expense of recycling in the importing country, and vice versa. However,
as long as WTO panels and the Appellate Bodyare obliged to follow the precise
“letter of the law” and the plain meaning of the WTO agreements’ provisions, as
opposed to teleological theories of legal interpretation,95 we are bound to have
occasional “mishaps” such as the one described here.96
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3.

The Chapeau of Article XX

Only if one reaches the conclusion that the import measure in question falls
within the terms of Article XX(b) or (g), one needs to address the question of whether
that measure also meets the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX. This opening
clause of Article XX deals more with the manner in which that measure is applied
than with its specific content.97 It prohibits such application of a measure at issue
(otherwise falling within the scope of Article XX(g)) as would constitute “arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination” between countries where the same conditions apply, or a
“disguised restriction on international trade”.
The import measure in our case is on its face discriminatory, whether in the
form of a levy imposed on the imported recycled products, and not on like domestic
products, or in the form of an import restriction, while not restricting domestic
production similarly.98 The question, however, remains if it constitutes an “arbitrary
or unjustifiable” discrimination? Clearly, there must be more to the measure than just
“discrimination”. Otherwise almost no measure that violates Article III (“National
Treatment”) or Article XI (“Quantitative Restrictions”) would be capable of
qualifying for an Article XX exception. As has been recognized by the Appellate
Body, the provision of the chapeau could not logically refer to the same standards by
which a violation of a substantive rule has been determined to have occurred, lest we
deprive Article XX of any meaning.99 In this case one would argue that the
discrimination between imported and domestic goods is not arbitrary or unjustified,
but rather based on a relevant distinction: the imported goods is subsidized and
therefore lower priced, while the domestic goods is not. Moreover, the conditions that
prevail in the two countries are not the same; the exporting country has legislation that
mandates recycling and places its costs on the industry, while the importing country
has no such legislation, and perhaps no political or bureaucratic means to adopt and
enforce it. Thus, the condition, according to the chapeau, for the existence of
“unjustified discrimination” is not fulfilled. The measure in question can also not be
seen as a “disguised restriction on international trade”, since it does not amount to a
“concealed or unannounced measure”, nor to an “abuse or illegitimate use” of any of
the exceptions of Article XX under the guise of a legitimate measure.100 Therefore,
the importing country would seem to be justified under Article XX when taking one
of these measures in order to preserve domestic recycling and conservation of
exhaustible natural resources.
4.

The Requirement to Adopt the “Least Trade Restrictive Measure”

regulations on who may engage in recycling, restricting it to firms authorized by the authorities as
fulfilling certain environmental standards etc.
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For further discussion of the significance of the interpretative approach of WTO bodies, see below,
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Another likely obstacle on the use of Article XX is the requirement on the invoking
Member to show that the measure taken is the least trade-distorting measure that can
be taken in order to achieve the objectives of either paragraph (b) or (g). This
requirement is not spelled out expressly in Article XX, but has been read into several
of its components. In particular, it has been seen as part of the “necessity”
requirement of subparagraph (b),101 and to a lesser degree of subparagraph (g).102 It
also appears to have been seen as part of the chapeau, in relation to the “arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination” clause. This view is based upon the implied rationale
that if there is an alternative, less discriminatory measure, that could have achieved
the same policy objective with equal effectiveness, then the measure adopted cannot
be said to be justified, but rather amounts to “unjustified discrimination”.103
Hence, in our case, a WTO panel may ask the imposing government why it did
not resort to a less discriminatory and less trade restrictive alternative, such as taking
upon itself to collect the waste, in order to prevent the harm to the environment.
Alternatively – so the panel may ask - it could have adopted a recycling regime
similar to that of the exporting country (hopefully resulting in similar payments to the
domestic recycling plants), thus avoiding the need to resort to discriminatory import
measures.
This, again, is where the asymmetry of resources between developed and
developing countries comes in. The problem of many developing countries is that
they lack both the economic resources and the domestic political clout to adopt the
type of sophisticated and expensive recycling schemes that have been adopted in
Western developed countries during the last few years. Such schemes require, among
other things, elaborate collection facilities spread around the whole country and
meticulously planned public relations campaigns in order to create consumer
awareness of the importance of recycling. In countries where a large part of the
population is concerned with how to provide its most basic needs for sustenance, the
chances for such a scheme to succeed are quite slim. Does that mean that they are
condemned to see their own limited recycling activities collapse before those of
developed countries?
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A case that amply illustrates how disregard of this asymmetry may lead to
unfair and even unfortunate results is the Thai Cigarette Case.104 In that case, the
United States challenged a ban on imports of cigarettes into Thailand as a violation of
Article XI of the GATT. Thailand defended the ban under Article XX(b) as
“necessary to protect human health”. While no comparable ban existed on domestic
Thai cigarettes, the Thai government claimed that American imports were more likely
to induce women and young persons to take up smoking, because of sophisticated
advertising directed at those groups. Thailand also argued that American cigarettes
were somehow more addictive or more likely to be consumed in larger quantities than
comparable Thai cigarettes, due to their chemical composition, but was unable to
support this allegation by sufficient scientific evidence. The panel pronounced the
Thai measure as inconsistent with the GATT, noting that the Thai government could
have introduced alternative non-discriminatory measures, such as labeling and
disclosure regulations, general ban on cigarette advertisement and higher taxes. In
coming to this conclusion, the panel simply ignored the possibility that what seems as
a perfectly sensible alternative to a panel member, may be politically or economically
unavailable to the government of a developing country. It may involve high
regulatory and compliance costs and may be impracticable to implement effectively
within an undeveloped public administration system. Indeed, statistical evidence from
Thailand suggests that there was a significant increase in the annual per capita
consumption of cigarettes in Thailand following the lifting of the import ban as a
result of the GATT panel ruling,105 undoubtedly with adverse impact on public health.
It is of course hard to establish a clear causal link between the rise in cigarette imports
and the increase in consumption, but there is at least a good chance that such link
exists and that it supports the claim that the alternative measures suggested by the
GATT panel were either unavailable to the Thai authorities or ineffective in curbing
cigarette consumption.
Hence, WTO panels ought to be very cautious in utilizing the “least tradedistorting measure” requirement, in particular in relation to developing countries. In
our case, it would be totally unacceptable to expect the importing country to adopt a
specific model of national recycling promotion, especially one that involves high
involvement of government resources. Import measures may therefore be the only
viable option, and should not be easily dismissed as failing the “least trade-distorting
measure” test.

E.

Summary and Indecisive Conclusions: Textualism or Teleology?

This article has discussed the problem of privately subsidized recycling schemes and
their potential harm to the environment of developing countries. In its title, we posed
the question of whether international trade law has a solution to this problem. The
short answer to this question seems to be that it depends on the interpretative
approach that will be taken by the international tribunal charged with ruling on this
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matter. A strict textual approach is likely to lead to a negative answer, while a more
teleological or purposive approach may in fact lead to a solution, by permitting the
harmed country to employ protective import measures. This conclusion has been a
recurring theme in our legal analysis of the various relevant provisions.
First, we came across it in our discussion of whether privately subsidized
recycling schemes amount to a “subsidy”, as this term is defined in the SCM
Agreement. We raised the possibility of a purposive interpretation of the words
“directed or entrusted”, in Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement, so that it
could be seen as encompassing any act that is functionally equivalent to a direction or
entrustment. This possibility, however, seems to have been already precluded by the
ruling of the WTO Exports Restraints panel106, which adopted a strict textual
approach requiring an “explicit and affirmative action” and not anything functionally
equivalent. While this would preclude the possibility that governmentally induced, but
privately paid, subsidies to recycling plants could be considered as a “subsidy” under
the SCM Agreement, there is still the possibility that the collection and supply for free
of raw-material, in the form of recyclable waste, to recycling plants could qualify as
such subsidy. This conclusion may even hold under a textual, non-purposive,
approach, given that the private body discussed here – or, at least, the industries that
have established it – have in fact been directed or commanded to collect and recycle.
However, in order to qualify as a “subsidy”, the provision of these goods and services
to the recycling plant would still have to fulfill two more conditions specified in the
provision, namely that this function is one “which would normally be vested in the
government”, and that “the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices normally
followed by governments”. In the discussion above, we suggested several alternative
meanings that could be given to these conditions.107 It was shown that while generally
the Exports Restraints panel has followed a strict textual approach, in its reading of
the second condition it has added elements that are not included in the provision. It is
suggested that a more likely interpretation should lead to the conclusion that at least
the second condition is met by the recycling schemes in question. Nevertheless, it
remains questionable, considering in particular the Export Restraints Case, whether
WTO panels will be willing to extend the “private body” provision of SCM
Agreement Article 1 to include payments or services under such schemes.
Based on our normative analysis of the issue, we reach the conclusion that this
situation is unsatisfactory and requires amendment. Since the drafters of the provision
clearly had understood that governments could use private bodies in order to channel
subsidies through them to selected beneficiaries, they ought to have realized that such
use could be made by means more subtle than express directions carried out with
governmental attributes. What should count is the fact that there is a governmentally
induced subsidy by direct transfer of funds, which makes no commercial sense per se
(in the absence of the governmental interference), and which confers a benefit on the
recipient in relation to the market. The definition should therefore have been
formulated in such a way as to prevent the possibility of evading the provisions of the
SCM Agreement simply by transferring the subsidizing function to a private body. It
is suggested, therefore, that the WTO use either the amendment procedure, provided
for in Article X of the WTO Agreement, or the Article IX mechanism in orderto
106
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adopt a binding interpretation of the private body provision, in line with the more
logical definition suggested.
The textual-purposive rift was encountered again in connection with the
question of whether the term “adverse effects” in Article 5 of the SCM Agreement
may be read to include harm to the environment. A strict textual reading, based on
reference to negotiation history will lead to the conclusion that the answer is no. A
more teleological-purposive approach could consider the WTO Agreement’s declared
commitment to sustainable development and to the protection and preservation of the
environment, as well as the fact that the SCM Agreement itself includes some implicit
recognition of the importance of these objectives, and reach an affirmative answer.
Since it is unlikely that a WTO panel will adopt the latter approach, it is again
recommended that WTO members themselves clarify the matter by using either the
amendment or the interpretation mechanism.
Finally, we encountered this recurring theme a third time in our discussion of
GATT Article XX, the WTO regime’s general exception clause, in connection with
the last sentence of subparagraph (g), which requires that the conservation measures
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption. While this sentence has been declared by the Appellate Body to
constitute a requirement of even-handedness, the lack of restrictions on domestic
production or consumption in this case is not a sign of uneven-handedness. On the
contrary; the import restriction, in particular if it is in the form of a countervailing
duty, is aimed at restoring even-handedness and equality, and to allow the
continuation of recycling activity in the importing country just like recycling is taking
place in the exporting country. Nevertheless, only a very “free” and purposive
interpretation of this provision can avert the outcome rendering the Article XX(g)
exception inapplicable to the case at hand.108
If we were to judge from the narrow perspective of these three examples
alone, the inevitable conclusion would be that the teleological-purposive approach to
interpretation is preferable to the textual-formalistic one, since the former leads to
normatively superior results. Not only are these results more satisfactory in terms of
environmental values, but they also seem to be more in line with the basic rationales
and policy objectives of the WTO and its relevant agreements. This of course is not
surprising, since the purposive approach is aimed precisely toward that goal: to
interpret the provisions of a specific instrument in line with its perceived policy
goals.109 This approach recognizes the limits of language and the shortcomings of
legal formulations (and formulators…), and strives to rise above the language,
whenever it is clear that the plain meaning of the text fails to lead to the policy goals
of the instrument in question. However, along with its obvious advantages, the
purposive approach has also several drawbacks. Unlike the wording of a treaty, which
we know was agreed upon by the parties who signed it, its precise object and purpose
is something that is much harder to ascertain. As put by a former member of the WTO
Appellate Body:
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“…it is risky to ascertain the object and purpose that the parties pursued if
the object and purpose was not expressed in the treaty itself. Though
agreeing on a certain text, each party may have very different objects and
purposes in mind.”110
There is an inherent risk that the interpreter will impose his own subjective
perceptions in relation to the objectives and purposes of the treaty and to their
implications for the interpretation of one of its provisions. There is also a lesser
degree of certainty and predictability as to the precise meaning of each provision.
Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,111 struck a
certain compromise between these two interpretative approaches when it provided
that “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose”. While giving a certain preference to the “ordinary meaning”, the
Convention still directs interpreters to attach significance to the treaty’s context,
object and purpose. The Appellate Body has consistently recognized Articles 31 and
32 of the Vienna Convention as the “customary rules of interpretation of public
international law”, which it is obliged to follow according to Article 3.2 of the
DSU.112 However, it is quite clear that it has attached a much greater weight to the
first component of the formula (“the ordinary meaning”), than to the other three.113
The Appellate Body has in fact opted for the more predictable and less activist
method of interpretation. It is also quite clear that what has motivated its choice is the
quest for legitimacy.114 It has largely protected the Appellate Body and the WTO
panels from the criticism that their reports have added to or diminished the rights and
obligations provided in the covered agreements, which is expressly prohibited under
DSU Article 3.2.115 It may also be one of the reasons for the success of the WTO
dispute settlement system, whereby in less than a decadeit has become a functioning
legal system with a decision output that is unsurpassed in international dispute
settlement.116
It is thereforevery possible that cases such as those discussed in this article,
may become victims of the Appellate Body’s quest for legitimacy, and perhaps it is
not too high of a price to pay. Perhaps these are the hard cases that otherwise would
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have made bad law. It is with this possibility in mind that I have also suggested the
“legislative” alternative of amendment or authorized interpretation by the WTO
members themselves. On the other hand, the failure in Cancun has demonstrated that
the political sphere of the WTO is in trouble and that its members seem unable to
reach any meaningful agreement at the time being. It is often in the wake of such
political stalemates that judicial activism is forced to emerge. If this will be the case in
the WTO only the future will tell.
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